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dc.contributor.authorKazandzhieva-Yordanova, Irina
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-27T10:54:13Z
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-27T10:54:18Z
dc.date.available2017-07-27T10:54:13Z
dc.date.available2017-07-27T10:54:18Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.issn0323-9004
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10610/3342
dc.description.abstractThe global financial crisis of 2007-2009 has revealed the negative effects of the TBTF doctrine and the need to take measures to limit government intervention in cases of insolvency of systemically important banks. In the EU, such measures were taken mostly in the supervision of systemically important banks, the capital requirements, the capacity of banks to absorb losses by using domestic resources, and deposit gurantee schemes. The study focuses on the development of a financial safety net. Priority is given to deposit guarantee schemes, which are an essential component of the financial safety net. The evolution of deposit guarantee schemes is studied and an analysis of its impact on the TBTF doctrine is made. The survey has shown that the development of deposit insurance has contradictory effects on the TBTF doctrine.us_US
dc.publisherTsenov Publishing Houseen_EN
dc.relation.ispartofseries1;2
dc.subjectsystemically important banksus_US
dc.subjectdeposit guarantee schemesus_US
dc.subjectfinancial safety netus_US
dc.subjectTBTFus_US
dc.subjectdepositorsus_US
dc.titleTOO BIG TO FAIL DOCTRINE AND THE FINANCIAL SAFETY NETus_US
dc.typeArticleus_US


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